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Current	  Controversies	  in	  Experimental	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  Routledge.]	  	  	  	  	   Take	  a	  few	  courses	  in	  cognitive	  science,	  and	  you	  are	  likely	  to	  come	  across	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  metaphor	  for	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  human	  mind.	  The	  metaphor	  goes	  like	  this:	  	  	   Consider	  a	  piece	  of	  computer	  software.	  The	  software	  consists	  of	  a	  collection	  of	  states	  and	  processes.	  We	  can	  predict	  what	  the	  software	  will	  do	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  complex	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  states	  and	  processes	  interact.	  	  The	  human	  mind	  works	  in	  more	  or	  less	  the	  same	  way.	  It	  too	  is	  just	  a	  complex	  collection	  of	  states	  and	  processes,	  and	  we	  can	  predict	  what	  a	  human	  being	  will	  do	  by	  thinking	  about	  the	  complex	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  states	  and	  processes	  interact.	  	  One	  can	  imagine	  someone	  saying:	  ‘I	  see	  all	  these	  states	  and	  processes,	  but	  aren’t	  you	  forgetting	  something	  further	  –	  namely,	  the	  person	  herself?’	  This	  question,	  however,	  is	  a	  foolish	  one.	  It	  is	  no	  more	  helpful	  than	  it	  would	  be	  to	  say:	  ‘I	  see	  all	  these	  states	  and	  processes,	  but	  where	  is	  the	  software	  itself?’	  The	  software	  just	  is	  a	  collection	  of	  states	  and	  processes,	  and	  the	  human	  mind	  is	  the	  same	  sort	  of	  thing.	  	  	  This	  metaphor	  does	  a	  good	  job	  of	  capturing	  the	  basic	  approach	  one	  finds	  throughout	  the	  sciences	  of	  the	  mind.	  We	  might	  say	  that	  it	  captures	  the	  scientific	  vision	  of	  how	  the	  human	  mind	  works.	  	  	   But	  one	  could	  also	  imagine	  another,	  very	  different	  metaphor	  for	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  mind.	  Perhaps	  something	  like	  this:	  	   Consider	  a	  royal	  court.	  The	  advisors	  and	  ministers	  each	  have	  an	  opportunity	  to	  advocate	  for	  a	  particular	  course	  of	  action.	  But	  it	  is	  not	  as	  though	  the	  advisors	  and	  ministers	  themselves	  make	  the	  final	  decision.	  Instead,	  there	  is	  another	  person	  in	  the	  court	  –	  the	  king	  or	  queen	  –	  who	  listens	  to	  all	  of	  the	  arguments,	  thinks	  them	  over,	  and	  then	  decides.	  	  The	  mind	  works	  in	  more	  or	  less	  the	  same	  way.	  Your	  mind	  might	  include	  various	  states	  and	  processes,	  but	  it	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  suggest	  that	  you	  yourself	  are	  just	  a	  collection	  of	  states	  and	  processes.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  you	  are	  a	  further	  thing	  –	  like	  the	  king	  or	  queen	  in	  the	  court	  –	  who	  can	  attend	  to	  the	  states	  and	  processes	  within	  your	  mind	  and	  then	  freely	  make	  a	  choice.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  theory	  presented	  here	  was	  developed	  in	  close	  collaboration	  with	  Shaun	  Nichols	  (as	  should	  be	  clear	  from	  sections	  1	  and	  2),	  and	  a	  number	  of	  aspects	  of	  it	  were	  directly	  inspired	  by	  the	  research	  of	  Eddy	  Nahmias	  and	  Dylan	  Murray	  (see	  sections	  3	  and	  4).	  I	  am	  deeply	  grateful	  to	  all	  three	  of	  these	  philosophers,	  both	  for	  their	  published	  research	  and	  for	  numerous	  invaluable	  conversations.	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When	  you	  do	  end	  up	  making	  a	  free	  choice,	  we	  might	  say	  that	  you	  made	  this	  choice	  ‘on	  the	  basis	  of’	  some	  of	  your	  psychological	  states.	  But	  the	  connection	  here	  is	  always	  indirect.	  It	  is	  not	  as	  though	  your	  psychological	  states	  actually	  cause	  your	  behavior;	  you	  just	  freely	  decide	  what	  to	  do,	  and	  sometimes	  you	  end	  up	  deciding	  to	  act	  in	  a	  way	  that	  accords	  with	  them.	  	  On	  this	  latter	  metaphor,	  the	  self	  is	  something	  that	  transcends	  all	  of	  the	  states	  and	  processes	  within	  the	  mind.	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  something	  that	  transcends	  the	  whole	  causal	  order.	  We	  might	  therefore	  refer	  to	  this	  second	  view	  as	  the	  transcendence	  vision.	  	   A	  question	  now	  arises	  as	  to	  which	  of	  these	  two	  visions	  best	  captures	  people’s	  ordinary	  understanding	  of	  human	  action.	  Thus,	  suppose	  that	  in	  the	  course	  of	  a	  perfectly	  ordinary	  conversation,	  someone	  utters	  the	  sentence:	  	  ‘John	  went	  to	  New	  York	  because	  he	  wanted	  to	  visit	  his	  sister.’	  	  Presumably,	  the	  person	  uttering	  this	  sentence	  thinks	  of	  John	  as	  choosing	  to	  go	  to	  New	  York	  with	  free	  will.	  That	  is,	  the	  person	  assumes	  that	  John	  freely	  decided	  to	  perform	  this	  action	  and	  was	  not	  in	  any	  way	  compelled.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  sentence	  quite	  clearly	  states	  that	  John’s	  action	  can	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  his	  psychological	  states.	  Specifically,	  the	  sentence	  says	  that	  John	  performed	  this	  action	  (going	  to	  New	  York)	  because	  he	  had	  a	  particular	  desire	  (to	  visit	  his	  sister).	  So	  it	  seems	  that	  we	  are	  faced	  with	  a	  problem.	  How	  exactly	  do	  people	  ordinarily	  understand	  the	  role	  of	  psychological	  states	  in	  cases	  of	  free	  action?	  Can	  we	  capture	  people’s	  ordinary	  understanding	  in	  terms	  of	  something	  like	  the	  scientific	  vision,	  or	  do	  we	  need	  to	  invoke	  something	  more	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  the	  transcendence	  vision?	  	   In	  existing	  work	  on	  people’s	  understanding	  of	  mind	  and	  action,	  it	  is	  common	  for	  researchers	  to	  ignore	  the	  whole	  issue	  of	  free	  will	  and	  to	  assume	  that	  people’s	  ordinary	  understanding	  conforms,	  at	  least	  in	  broad	  outlines,	  to	  the	  scientific	  vision.	  Thus,	  it	  has	  been	  said	  that	  people’s	  ordinary	  understanding	  works	  something	  like	  a	  scientific	  theory,	  that	  people	  try	  to	  understand	  human	  action	  by	  looking	  for	  its	  causes	  and,	  in	  particular,	  that	  they	  think	  of	  human	  action	  as	  caused	  by	  psychological	  states.	  On	  this	  sort	  of	  view,	  the	  contemporary	  scientific	  study	  of	  human	  cognition	  isn’t	  really	  too	  much	  of	  a	  departure	  from	  people’s	  ordinary	  way	  of	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  mind.	  It	  is	  just	  a	  more	  precise,	  systematic	  way	  of	  doing	  the	  very	  same	  thing	  that	  people	  do	  all	  the	  time.	  (For	  discussion,	  see	  Bloom	  2006;	  Churchland	  1981;	  Gopnik	  &	  Wellman	  1992;	  Lewis	  1972;	  Nichols	  2006.)	  	   I	  will	  be	  arguing	  that	  this	  view	  is	  mistaken.	  I	  suggest	  that	  people’s	  ordinary	  way	  of	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  mind	  conforms	  more	  to	  the	  transcendence	  vision.	  Hence,	  the	  approach	  that	  we	  find	  in	  contemporary	  cognitive	  science	  is	  not	  just	  a	  more	  precise	  or	  systematic	  way	  of	  doing	  the	  same	  thing	  we	  do	  all	  the	  time.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  basic	  vision	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  that	  approach	  is	  actually	  incompatible	  with	  people’s	  ordinary	  way	  of	  understanding	  human	  freedom.	  	  	  	   The	  evidence	  for	  this	  claim	  comes	  primarily	  from	  empirical	  work	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  people’s	  ordinary	  understanding.	  Accordingly,	  we	  will	  be	  looking	  at	  a	  series	  of	  different	  empirical	  studies.	  Each	  study	  might	  be	  somewhat	  inconclusive	  on	  its	  own,	  but	  together,	  they	  form	  a	  powerful	  and	  surprisingly	  coherent	  package.	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1.	  Let	  us	  begin	  with	  the	  most	  straightforward	  and	  obvious	  method	  for	  addressing	  these	  questions.	  If	  we	  want	  to	  know	  how	  people	  ordinarily	  understand	  human	  behavior,	  one	  approach	  would	  be	  to	  start	  by	  just	  asking	  them	  directly.	  	  A	  few	  years	  ago,	  Shaun	  Nichols	  and	  I	  conducted	  an	  investigation	  using	  precisely	  this	  approach	  (Nichols	  &	  Knobe	  2007).	  Participants	  were	  told	  to	  imagine	  two	  possible	  universes.	  First,	  they	  were	  introduced	  to	  a	  universe	  in	  which	  every	  event	  was	  caused	  by	  some	  prior	  event:	  Imagine	  a	  universe	  (Universe	  A)	  in	  which	  everything	  that	  happens	  is	  completely	  caused	  by	  whatever	  happened	  before	  it.	  	  This	  is	  true	  from	  the	  very	  beginning	  of	  the	  universe,	  so	  what	  happened	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  universe	  caused	  what	  happened	  next,	  and	  so	  on	  right	  up	  until	  the	  present.	  Then	  they	  were	  told	  about	  a	  second	  universe	  that	  was	  similar	  to	  the	  first	  in	  many	  ways	  but	  that	  differed	  in	  one	  crucial	  respect.	  	  Now	  imagine	  a	  universe	  (Universe	  B)	  in	  which	  almost	  everything	  that	  happens	  is	  completely	  caused	  by	  whatever	  happened	  before	  it.	  	  The	  one	  exception	  is	  human	  decision	  making.	  So	  in	  the	  first	  universe,	  every	  event	  is	  caused	  by	  some	  prior	  event,	  while	  in	  the	  second	  universe,	  human	  decisions	  are	  not	  caused	  by	  any	  prior	  event	  at	  all;	  they	  are	  just	  freely	  chosen.	  After	  reading	  about	  these	  two	  possible	  universes,	  participants	  were	  asked:	  	   Which	  of	  these	  universes	  do	  you	  think	  is	  most	  like	  ours?	  (circle	  one)	  Universe	  A	   Universe	  B	  Let	  us	  now	  introduce	  a	  helpful	  abbreviation.	  Instead	  of	  saying	  that	  an	  event	  is	  ‘completely	  caused	  by	  whatever	  happened	  before	  it,’	  we	  will	  say	  that	  it	  is	  causally	  determined.	  We	  can	  then	  state	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  universes	  as	  follows:	  In	  Universe	  A,	  everything	  is	  causally	  determined,	  whereas	  in	  Universe	  B,	  human	  actions	  are	  not	  causally	  determined.	  Which	  type	  of	  universe	  do	  people	  think	  is	  most	  like	  ours?	  	  The	  overwhelming	  answer	  is:	  Universe	  B.	  In	  our	  original	  studies,	  this	  answer	  was	  chosen	  by	  over	  90%	  of	  participants.	  In	  other	  words,	  when	  people	  were	  asked	  directly,	  they	  tended	  to	  say	  that	  our	  universe	  was	  like	  a	  universe	  in	  which	  almost	  all	  events	  were	  causally	  determined	  but	  human	  actions	  were	  not.	  This	  result	  suggests	  that	  people’s	  explicit	  answers	  fit	  more	  closely	  with	  the	  transcendence	  vision	  than	  with	  the	  scientific	  vision.	  Most	  researchers	  working	  in	  this	  area	  would	  agree	  that	  this	  type	  of	  evidence	  is	  far	  from	  conclusive.	  They	  would	  say:	  ‘Our	  aim	  is	  to	  investigate	  the	  tacit	  mechanisms	  that	  people	  use	  all	  the	  time	  to	  understand	  human	  action.	  The	  best	  way	  to	  figure	  out	  how	  these	  mechanisms	  work	  is	  to	  look	  at	  various	  aspects	  of	  people’s	  thinking	  (their	  moral	  judgments,	  their	  explanations,	  etc.)	  and	  try	  to	  use	  these	  aspects	  of	  people’s	  thinking	  as	  clues	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  most	  basic	  understanding.	  The	  technique	  you’ve	  used	  here	  is	  far	  less	  reliable.	  If	  you	  insist	  on	  just	  directly	  asking	  people	  abstract	  questions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  action,	  there	  is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  you	  will	  be	  tapping	  into	  these	  mechanisms	  in	  any	  way.	  The	  answers	  people	  give	  might	  simply	  reflect	  the	  explicit	  theories	  they	  have	  picked	  up	  in	  various	  philosophical	  conversations.	  (Maybe	  they	  were	  exposed	  to	  ideas	  from	  Christian	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theology	  in	  their	  Sunday	  school	  classes,	  and	  they	  are	  simply	  parroting	  back	  something	  they’ve	  learned	  there.)’	  This	  is	  a	  powerful	  objection,	  and	  it	  deserves	  to	  be	  taken	  very	  seriously.	  To	  address	  it,	  we	  teamed	  up	  with	  Hagop	  Sarkissian	  and	  tried	  running	  a	  cross-­‐cultural	  study.	  Participants	  were	  recruited	  from	  the	  United	  States,	  Hong	  Kong,	  India	  and	  Colombia.	  All	  of	  these	  participants	  were	  then	  given	  precisely	  the	  same	  question	  described	  above	  (Sarkissian,	  Chatterjee,	  De	  Brigard,	  Knobe,	  Nichols	  &	  Sirker	  2010).	  The	  results	  showed	  no	  significant	  differences	  between	  cultures.	  In	  all	  four	  cultures,	  the	  majority	  of	  participants	  said	  that	  our	  own	  universe	  is	  most	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  in	  which	  human	  action	  is	  not	  causally	  determined.	  	  	   This	  result	  comes	  as	  something	  of	  a	  surprise.	  Here	  we	  have	  people	  from	  radically	  different	  cultures,	  with	  quite	  different	  historical	  and	  religious	  traditions,	  and	  yet	  they	  all	  seem	  to	  be	  converging	  on	  the	  same	  answer	  to	  this	  highly	  abstract	  question.	  How	  are	  we	  to	  explain	  this	  convergence?	  It	  hardly	  seems	  plausible	  to	  suggest	  that	  all	  of	  these	  people	  have	  been	  taking	  classes	  in	  which	  they	  are	  explicitly	  taught	  the	  same	  philosophical	  theory.	  Presumably,	  we	  need	  to	  provide	  some	  other	  type	  of	  explanation.	  If	  we	  assume	  that	  people’s	  ordinary	  understanding	  of	  action	  follows	  the	  transcendence	  vision,	  this	  task	  becomes	  quite	  simple.	  The	  explanation	  is	  that	  the	  experiment	  is	  accurately	  tapping	  into	  people’s	  ordinary	  understanding.	  (This	  understanding	  tells	  people	  that	  human	  action	  is	  not	  causally	  determined,	  and	  they	  answer	  the	  explicit	  theoretical	  questions	  accordingly.)	  By	  contrast,	  if	  we	  assume	  that	  people’s	  ordinary	  understanding	  follows	  the	  scientific	  vision,	  the	  matter	  becomes	  considerably	  more	  complex.	  We	  would	  need	  to	  argue	  that	  people’s	  tacit	  understanding	  is	  telling	  them	  that	  human	  action	  actually	  is	  causally	  determined	  but	  that	  there	  is	  some	  further	  factor	  –	  a	  factor	  that	  is	  equally	  present	  in	  all	  four	  of	  these	  cultures	  –	  which	  then	  obscures	  this	  tacit	  understanding	  and	  leads	  people	  to	  explicitly	  state	  that	  human	  action	  is	  not	  causally	  determined.	  It	  would	  require	  some	  ingenuity	  to	  develop	  an	  explanation	  along	  these	  lines,	  but	  perhaps	  future	  research	  will	  lead	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  theory	  that	  can	  successfully	  pull	  off	  this	  trick.	  	  
2.	  A	  question	  now	  arises	  about	  how	  people	  make	  judgments	  of	  moral	  responsibility.	  Do	  people	  think	  that	  an	  agent	  can	  be	  morally	  responsible	  for	  her	  behavior	  if	  this	  behavior	  is	  causally	  determined?	  Or	  do	  people	  think	  that	  a	  person	  can	  only	  be	  truly	  responsible	  if	  her	  behavior	  is	  freely	  chosen	  by	  a	  transcendent	  self?	  	  	   A	  number	  of	  studies	  have	  examined	  this	  question,	  and	  these	  studies	  have	  yielded	  a	  surprising	  result.	  Suppose	  we	  tell	  participants	  about	  an	  agent	  whose	  behavior	  is	  causally	  determined.	  Now	  suppose	  we	  tell	  them	  that	  this	  agent	  performs	  some	  immoral	  behavior.	  We	  might	  tell	  them	  that	  the	  agent	  has	  committed	  rape,	  or	  that	  he	  has	  robbed	  a	  bank,	  or	  that	  he	  has	  murdered	  an	  innocent	  person.	  Participants	  who	  have	  been	  given	  cases	  of	  this	  form	  tend	  to	  arrive	  at	  a	  striking	  sort	  of	  moral	  judgment.	  Even	  though	  they	  have	  been	  informed	  in	  no	  uncertain	  terms	  that	  the	  agent	  in	  the	  case	  is	  causally	  determined,	  they	  tend	  to	  say	  that	  the	  agent	  is	  fully	  morally	  responsible!	  	  This	  result	  was	  first	  uncovered	  in	  an	  influential	  paper	  by	  Nahmias,	  Morris,	  Nadelhoffer	  and	  Turner	  (2006),	  and	  it	  has	  since	  been	  replicated	  and	  extended	  by	  numerous	  other	  researchers	  (De	  Brigard,	  Mandelbaum	  &	  Ripley	  2009;	  Feltz	  &	  Cokely	  2009;	  Nahmias,	  Coates	  &	  Kvaran	  2007;	  Nichols	  &	  Knobe	  2007).	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  basic	  finding	  has	  been	  established	  beyond	  all	  reasonable	  doubt.	  
	   5	  
	   In	  one	  of	  the	  most	  impressive	  experimental	  demonstrations	  of	  this	  phenomenon	  (De	  Brigard,	  Mandelbaum	  &	  Ripley	  2009;	  Mandelbaum	  &	  Ripley	  forthcoming),	  participants	  were	  told	  to	  imagine	  a	  person	  named	  Dennis.	  They	  were	  informed	  that	  Dennis	  had	  a	  neurological	  disorder,	  that	  the	  bad	  things	  he	  did	  were	  completely	  caused	  by	  this	  neurological	  disorder,	  and	  that	  if	  other	  people	  were	  to	  have	  the	  same	  disorder,	  they	  would	  do	  the	  very	  same	  bad	  things.	  After	  receiving	  this	  information,	  participants	  were	  told	  that	  Dennis	  had	  raped	  a	  number	  of	  women,	  and	  they	  were	  asked	  whether	  he	  was	  morally	  responsible	  for	  his	  actions.	  Surprisingly,	  participants	  tended	  to	  say,	  even	  in	  this	  very	  extreme	  case,	  that	  Dennis	  actually	  was	  responsible.	  	  	   Now,	  one	  possible	  reaction	  to	  these	  results	  would	  be	  to	  say	  that	  people’s	  understanding	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  is	  more	  or	  less	  independent	  of	  questions	  about	  causal	  determinism.	  But	  Nichols	  and	  I	  thought	  that	  there	  might	  be	  more	  to	  the	  story.	  Our	  hunch	  was	  that	  people’s	  intuitions	  in	  these	  cases	  might	  be	  the	  product	  of	  two	  different	  psychological	  processes	  that	  were	  pulling	  them	  in	  opposite	  directions.	  More	  specifically,	  we	  thought	  that	  (a)	  when	  people	  are	  engaged	  in	  abstract	  theoretical	  reasoning,	  they	  use	  a	  conception	  according	  to	  which	  agents	  cannot	  be	  morally	  responsible	  for	  behavior	  that	  is	  causally	  determined,	  but	  then	  (b)	  when	  they	  hear	  about	  some	  specific	  concrete	  act	  of	  wrongdoing	  (rape,	  robbery,	  murder,	  etc.),	  a	  further	  process	  comes	  into	  play	  that	  leads	  them	  to	  say	  that	  the	  agent	  actually	  is	  responsible	  for	  his	  misdeeds.	  	   To	  test	  this	  hypothesis,	  we	  conducted	  an	  additional	  study	  (Nichols	  &	  Knobe	  2007).	  All	  participants	  received	  the	  description	  of	  the	  causally	  deterministic	  Universe	  A	  and	  were	  asked	  whether	  people	  within	  this	  universe	  could	  be	  morally	  responsible.	  But	  the	  study	  included	  an	  additional	  wrinkle:	  participants	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  be	  asked	  this	  question	  in	  one	  of	  two	  possible	  ways.	  Participants	  in	  the	  ‘concrete’	  condition	  received	  the	  question:	  In	  Universe	  A,	  a	  man	  named	  Bill	  has	  become	  attracted	  to	  his	  secretary,	  and	  he	  decides	  that	  the	  only	  way	  to	  be	  with	  her	  is	  to	  kill	  his	  wife	  and	  3	  children.	  He	  knows	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  escape	  from	  his	  house	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  fire.	  Before	  he	  leaves	  on	  a	  business	  trip,	  he	  sets	  up	  a	  device	  in	  his	  basement	  that	  burns	  down	  the	  house	  and	  kills	  his	  family.	  Is	  Bill	  fully	  morally	  responsible	  for	  killing	  his	  wife	  and	  children?	  Yes	   	  No	  In	  this	  condition,	  most	  participants	  (72%)	  gave	  the	  answer	  ‘Yes,’	  indicating	  that	  a	  causally	  determined	  agent	  could	  still	  be	  morally	  responsible.	  This	  first	  result	  simply	  replicates	  earlier	  findings.	  	  	   Then,	  in	  the	  ‘abstract’	  condition,	  participants	  received	  the	  question	  that	  did	  not	  mention	  any	  actual	  concrete	  misdeeds:	  	  In	  Universe	  A,	  is	  it	  possible	  for	  a	  person	  to	  be	  fully	  morally	  responsible	  for	  their	  actions?	  	  Yes	  	   No	  In	  this	  latter	  condition,	  participants	  gave	  exactly	  the	  opposite	  pattern	  of	  responses,	  with	  the	  vast	  majority	  (86%)	  choosing	  the	  answer	  ‘No.’	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   This	  difference	  between	  concrete	  and	  abstract	  judgments	  is	  a	  puzzling	  one,	  and	  the	  attempt	  to	  understand	  it	  has	  been	  one	  of	  the	  major	  preoccupations	  of	  experimental	  philosophy	  work	  on	  free	  will.	  There	  have	  been	  studies	  examining	  the	  phenomenon	  more	  systematically	  using	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  descriptions	  of	  determinism	  (Nahmias,	  Coates	  &	  Kvaran	  2007),	  studies	  manipulating	  people’s	  level	  of	  abstract	  thinking	  by	  asking	  them	  to	  think	  about	  either	  close	  or	  distant	  times	  (Weigel	  2011),	  even	  studies	  that	  go	  after	  these	  questions	  by	  manipulating	  the	  font	  in	  which	  the	  stimuli	  are	  written	  (Gonnerman,	  Reuter	  &	  Weinberg	  2012).	  A	  number	  of	  competing	  theoretical	  models	  have	  been	  proposed	  (Cova,	  Bertoux,	  Bourgeois-­‐Gironde	  &	  Dubois	  2012;	  Nahmias	  &	  Murray	  2010;	  Nichols	  &	  Knobe	  2007),	  but	  at	  this	  point,	  no	  clear	  consensus	  has	  emerged.	  Perhaps	  future	  work	  will	  bring	  more	  clarity	  to	  these	  issues.2	  	  	  For	  present	  purposes,	  however,	  we	  can	  focus	  on	  a	  slightly	  different	  question.	  Instead	  of	  asking	  why	  people	  are	  more	  inclined	  to	  regard	  the	  agent	  as	  responsible	  in	  concrete	  cases,	  we	  can	  ask	  why	  people	  do	  not	  regard	  the	  agent	  as	  obviously	  responsible	  in	  all	  of	  these	  cases.	  There	  is	  clearly	  something	  drawing	  people	  to	  the	  view	  that	  an	  agent	  can’t	  be	  morally	  responsible	  for	  behaviors	  that	  are	  causally	  determined.	  But	  what	  exactly	  is	  drawing	  people	  in	  this	  direction?	  Why	  do	  they	  see	  causal	  determinism	  as	  any	  problem	  at	  all	  for	  moral	  responsibility?	  	   At	  this	  point,	  one	  might	  offer	  a	  number	  of	  different	  hypotheses,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  striking	  fact	  that	  people’s	  worry	  about	  causal	  determinism	  can	  be	  very	  easily	  explained	  if	  we	  simply	  assume	  that	  people	  accept	  the	  transcendence	  vision.	  It	  then	  becomes	  unnecessary	  to	  make	  any	  complex	  further	  assumptions	  about	  the	  way	  people	  think	  about	  moral	  responsibility	  in	  particular.	  All	  one	  needs	  is	  the	  straightforward	  principle:	  	  	   People	  will	  be	  reluctant	  to	  hold	  an	  agent	  responsible	  for	  a	  behavior	  if	  they	  believe	  that	  this	  behavior	  was	  not	  even	  produced	  by	  the	  agent	  in	  question.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  In	  earlier	  work,	  Shaun	  Nichols	  and	  I	  suggested	  that	  this	  effect	  might	  be	  arising	  because	  people	  have	  an	  emotional	  reaction	  to	  the	  concrete	  case	  and	  this	  reaction	  biases	  their	  responses	  (Nichols	  &	  Knobe,	  2007).	  Over	  the	  past	  few	  years,	  this	  hypothesis	  has	  been	  put	  to	  the	  test	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  experiments,	  and	  at	  this	  point,	  I	  have	  to	  say	  that	  things	  are	  not	  looking	  good.	  First,	  a	  series	  of	  studies	  looked	  at	  cases	  that	  were	  entirely	  concrete	  but	  which	  differed	  in	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  provoke	  emotional	  reactions.	  A	  recent	  meta-­‐analysis	  of	  29	  such	  studies	  shows	  that	  people	  are	  indeed	  more	  inclined	  to	  ascribe	  moral	  responsibility	  in	  a	  deterministic	  universe	  when	  faced	  with	  a	  high-­‐affect	  case	  than	  with	  a	  low-­‐affect	  case	  but	  that	  this	  effect	  is	  quite	  small	  (d	  =	  .18)	  –	  not	  nearly	  large	  enough	  to	  explain	  the	  powerful	  impact	  of	  the	  original	  abstract/concrete	  manipulation	  (Feltz	  &	  Cova,	  2012).	  Second,	  a	  recent	  study	  looked	  at	  the	  responses	  given	  to	  abstract	  and	  concrete	  cases	  among	  participants	  with	  frontotemporal	  dementia.	  Though	  these	  participants	  show	  a	  deficit	  in	  their	  capacity	  for	  emotional	  response	  –	  and	  would	  therefore	  be	  expected	  to	  differ	  from	  neurotypical	  participants	  if	  the	  effect	  was	  driven	  by	  emotion	  –	  they	  ended	  up	  giving	  exactly	  the	  same	  pattern	  of	  responses	  seen	  in	  earlier	  studies	  (Cova,	  Bertoux,	  Bourgeois-­‐Gironde	  &	  Dubois,	  2012).	  	  	   In	  light	  of	  these	  results,	  I	  now	  suspect	  that	  the	  abstract/concrete	  effect	  is	  not,	  in	  fact	  due	  to	  emotional	  responses.	  Perhaps	  it	  can	  be	  explained	  instead	  by	  the	  very	  theory	  proposed	  here:	  People	  have	  a	  very	  strong	  tendency	  to	  think	  of	  human	  decision-­‐making	  in	  terms	  of	  transcendence.	  Thus,	  no	  matter	  how	  much	  one	  emphasizes	  determinism,	  if	  the	  case	  is	  presented	  with	  sufficient	  concreteness,	  participants	  immediately	  apply	  their	  default	  (transcendence-­‐based)	  framework.	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The	  key	  result	  then	  follows	  almost	  immediately.	  If	  the	  transcendence	  vision	  is	  correct,	  then	  all	  behaviors	  that	  are	  causally	  determined	  –	  even	  if	  they	  are	  determined	  by	  the	  agent’s	  own	  psychological	  states	  –	  will	  not	  truly	  have	  been	  produced	  by	  the	  agent	  herself.	  	  	   We	  now	  arrive	  at	  a	  provisional	  conclusion.	  Experimental	  results	  show	  that	  people	  see	  causal	  determinism	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  moral	  responsibility,	  and	  any	  correct	  theory	  here	  will	  have	  to	  explain	  why	  people	  have	  this	  intuition.	  If	  we	  start	  out	  with	  the	  view	  that	  people	  accept	  the	  scientific	  vision,	  we	  might	  be	  able	  to	  offer	  an	  explanation	  by	  introducing	  certain	  further	  assumptions.	  But	  the	  situation	  becomes	  very	  different	  if	  we	  start	  out	  with	  the	  view	  that	  people	  accept	  the	  transcendence	  vision.	  It	  then	  becomes	  possible	  to	  explain	  the	  results	  without	  introducing	  any	  further	  controversial	  assumptions.	  Everything	  simply	  follows	  from	  people’s	  understanding	  of	  what	  would	  be	  required	  for	  an	  agent	  even	  to	  have	  produced	  the	  action	  at	  all.	  	  	  
3.	  In	  an	  ingenious	  series	  of	  studies,	  Nahmias	  and	  Murray	  (2010)	  looked	  more	  directly	  at	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  people’s	  understanding	  of	  psychological	  states	  impacts	  their	  intuitions	  about	  free	  will.	  Once	  again,	  participants	  were	  told	  about	  the	  causally	  deterministic	  Universe	  A,	  but	  this	  time,	  they	  were	  asked	  whether	  they	  agreed	  or	  disagreed	  with	  statements	  of	  the	  form:	  	  
• In	  Universe	  A,	  what	  a	  person	  believes	  has	  no	  effect	  on	  what	  they	  end	  up	  being	  caused	  to	  do.	  
• In	  Universe	  A,	  what	  a	  person	  wants	  has	  no	  effect	  on	  what	  they	  end	  up	  being	  caused	  to	  do.	  Surprisingly,	  participants	  tend	  to	  agree	  with	  these	  statements.	  In	  other	  words,	  when	  participants	  are	  informed	  that	  an	  agent’s	  actions	  are	  causally	  determined,	  they	  tend	  to	  infer	  that	  the	  agent’s	  actions	  do	  not	  depend	  in	  any	  way	  on	  her	  beliefs	  and	  desires.	  This	  finding	  constitutes	  a	  genuine	  breakthrough	  within	  research	  in	  this	  area,	  and	  it	  is	  worth	  taking	  the	  time	  to	  think	  in	  detail	  about	  what	  it	  might	  be	  telling	  us.	  	   To	  get	  a	  better	  sense	  for	  the	  broader	  implications	  of	  the	  Nahmias-­‐Murray	  findings,	  it	  might	  be	  helpful	  to	  introduce	  an	  analogy.	  Suppose	  we	  are	  looking	  at	  a	  house	  that	  has	  been	  destroyed,	  and	  I	  tell	  you:	  ‘This	  house	  burned	  down	  in	  a	  fire.’	  Now	  suppose	  that	  a	  little	  while	  later	  you	  receive	  one	  further	  piece	  of	  information:	  ‘The	  destruction	  of	  the	  house	  was	  completely	  caused	  by	  an	  event	  that	  occurred	  three	  days	  ago.’	  Presumably,	  you	  would	  not	  conclude	  that	  the	  fire	  had	  no	  effect	  at	  all	  on	  what	  happened	  to	  the	  house.	  Instead,	  you	  would	  probably	  assume	  that	  the	  fire	  was	  precisely	  the	  event	  that	  occurred	  three	  days	  ago	  and	  completely	  caused	  the	  destruction.	  (You	  might	  then	  infer	  that	  if	  the	  fire	  had	  never	  occurred,	  the	  house	  would	  still	  be	  in	  fine	  shape	  today.)	  What	  the	  Nahmias-­‐Murray	  results	  show	  is	  that	  people	  do	  not	  apply	  this	  same	  kind	  of	  reasoning	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  human	  action	  and	  mental	  states.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  when	  people	  are	  told	  that	  an	  agent’s	  actions	  are	  completely	  caused	  by	  prior	  events,	  they	  conclude	  that	  the	  agent’s	  beliefs	  and	  desires	  could	  not	  possibly	  be	  having	  any	  effect	  on	  what	  she	  ends	  up	  doing.	  This	  result	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  people	  are	  conceptualizing	  the	  relationship	  between	  an	  agent’s	  beliefs	  and	  desires	  and	  her	  actions	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  radically	  different	  from	  the	  way	  they	  would	  normally	  conceptualize	  the	  relationship	  between	  a	  fire	  and	  the	  destruction	  of	  a	  house.	  Our	  aim	  now	  is	  to	  get	  a	  better	  sense	  for	  the	  nature	  of	  that	  difference.	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   Let	  us	  begin	  by	  stating	  the	  obvious.	  Clearly,	  people	  often	  explain	  why	  an	  agent	  acted	  in	  the	  way	  she	  did	  by	  referring	  to	  her	  beliefs	  and	  desires.	  Thus,	  if	  we	  pick	  out	  an	  agent’s	  action	  and	  ask	  ‘Why	  did	  she	  do	  that?’	  we	  might	  receive	  an	  answer	  like:	  ‘Because	  she	  believed	  that	  it	  was	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do.’	  Then,	  continuing	  the	  chain	  of	  explanation	  back	  a	  step,	  people	  often	  explain	  an	  agent’s	  beliefs	  and	  desires	  by	  tracing	  them	  to	  facts	  about	  her	  external	  environment.	  So	  if	  we	  ask	  the	  question	  ‘Why	  did	  she	  believe	  it	  was	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do?’	  we	  may	  receive	  the	  answer:	  ‘Because	  her	  parents	  always	  told	  her	  that	  it	  was	  right	  to	  behave	  in	  that	  way.’	  	  	   Yet,	  though	  it	  is	  perfectly	  clear	  that	  people	  offer	  explanations	  of	  this	  form,	  it	  has	  proven	  remarkably	  difficult	  to	  say	  precisely	  what	  these	  explanations	  mean.	  In	  the	  mid-­‐twentieth	  century,	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  philosophical	  work	  went	  into	  trying	  to	  understand	  the	  sentences	  people	  use,	  in	  ordinary	  language,	  to	  explain	  an	  agent’s	  actions	  in	  terms	  of	  her	  beliefs	  and	  desires.	  Philosophers	  developed	  a	  variety	  of	  opposing	  theories	  (Davidson	  1963;	  Hart	  &	  Honoré	  1959;	  Ryle	  1949;	  Wittgenstein	  1953),	  but	  the	  issue	  was	  never	  fully	  resolved.	  In	  my	  view,	  the	  question	  is	  just	  as	  mysterious	  today	  as	  it	  was	  when	  it	  was	  first	  posed.	  	   One	  obvious	  answer	  would	  be	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  an	  agent’s	  beliefs	  and	  desires	  and	  her	  actions	  is	  best	  understood	  as	  a	  straightforward	  case	  of	  causation	  (e.g.,	  Davidson	  1963).	  On	  this	  view,	  what	  we	  have	  is	  a	  causal	  chain:	  the	  agent’s	  environment	  causes	  her	  to	  have	  certain	  beliefs	  and	  desires,	  which	  in	  turn	  cause	  her	  to	  perform	  a	  particular	  action.	  	   Environment	   	  Beliefs	  and	  Desires	   	  Action	  	  Many	  researchers	  working	  on	  these	  issues	  will	  immediately	  feel	  that	  this	  picture	  is	  clearly	  the	  correct	  one.	  In	  fact,	  some	  researchers	  may	  find	  themselves	  hard-­‐pressed	  even	  to	  imagine	  an	  alternative.	  	  	   But	  if	  we	  start	  out	  with	  the	  assumption	  that	  people	  accept	  a	  picture	  like	  this	  one,	  we	  soon	  run	  into	  a	  major	  difficulty.	  According	  to	  the	  picture,	  most	  people’s	  actions	  are	  causally	  determined	  by	  their	  beliefs	  and	  desires.	  It	  should	  therefore	  be	  blazingly	  obvious	  that	  even	  if	  an	  agent’s	  actions	  are	  causally	  determined,	  her	  beliefs	  and	  desires	  can	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  what	  she	  does.	  (After	  all,	  the	  assumption	  is	  that	  people	  are	  thinking	  that,	  in	  a	  typical	  case,	  it	  is	  precisely	  the	  agent’s	  beliefs	  and	  desires	  that	  causally	  determine	  her	  actions.)	  But	  now	  we	  face	  the	  problem.	  For	  what	  the	  Nahmias-­‐Murray	  results	  show	  is	  that	  people	  don’t	  endorse	  this	  conclusion.	  Instead,	  people	  tend	  to	  say	  that	  if	  an	  agent’s	  actions	  are	  causally	  determined,	  her	  beliefs	  and	  desires	  cannot	  have	  any	  effect	  at	  all	  on	  what	  she	  does.	  Why	  might	  people	  be	  responding	  in	  this	  way?	  	   One	  natural	  answer	  would	  be	  that	  people	  reject	  the	  whole	  picture	  we	  have	  been	  sketching.	  Instead,	  they	  might	  accept	  something	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  the	  transcendence	  vision.	  On	  this	  latter	  picture,	  the	  relationship	  between	  an	  agent’s	  psychological	  states	  and	  her	  actions	  is	  not	  a	  simple	  causal	  chain.	  It	  is	  something	  more	  complex:	  	  	   Environment	   	  Beliefs	  and	  Desires	   	  Action	  	  Here	  the	  dotted	  line	  signifies	  a	  relationship	  that	  involves	  not	  straightforward	  causal	  explanation	  but	  rather	  what	  philosophers	  call	  ‘reason	  explanation.’	  In	  other	  words,	  on	  this	  view,	  when	  people	  explain	  an	  action	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  belief,	  they	  are	  not	  saying	  that	  the	  action	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was	  caused	  by	  the	  belief.	  Rather,	  they	  are	  saying	  that	  the	  action	  was	  chosen	  for	  a	  reason.	  (For	  example,	  they	  might	  be	  saying	  that	  the	  agent’s	  reason	  for	  choosing	  the	  action	  was	  her	  belief	  that	  it	  was	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do.)	  	  It	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  say	  exactly	  what	  it	  means	  for	  an	  agent	  to	  do	  something	  ‘for	  a	  reason’	  in	  the	  relevant	  sense.	  Different	  theorists	  have	  developed	  quite	  different	  accounts	  (Anscombe	  1957;	  Hart	  &	  Honoré	  1959;	  Wittgenstein	  1958:14-­‐15),	  and	  the	  debate	  continues	  up	  until	  the	  present	  day	  (Aguilar	  &	  Buckareff	  2010;	  Knobe	  2007;	  Malle	  2004;	  Mele	  2010).	  For	  present	  purposes,	  however,	  we	  do	  not	  need	  to	  resolve	  that	  controversy.	  The	  key	  idea	  is	  just	  that,	  on	  the	  transcendence	  vision,	  an	  agent	  can	  do	  something	  for	  a	  reason	  even	  when	  the	  resulting	  action	  was	  freely	  chosen	  and	  not	  caused	  by	  anything	  at	  all.	  	   If	  we	  start	  out	  with	  this	  sort	  of	  framework,	  it	  becomes	  easy	  to	  see	  why	  people	  might	  respond	  as	  they	  do	  in	  the	  Nahmias-­‐Murray	  experiments.	  People	  think	  that	  when	  an	  agent	  acts	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  reasons,	  her	  behaviors	  are	  not	  causally	  determined.	  Then	  they	  are	  told	  about	  a	  universe	  that	  differs	  from	  our	  own	  in	  that	  everything	  in	  it	  actually	  is	  causally	  determined.	  They	  therefore	  infer	  that	  agents	  in	  this	  universe	  do	  not	  do	  things	  for	  reasons.	  It	  is	  only	  a	  small	  step	  from	  this	  inference	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  beliefs	  and	  desires	  of	  these	  agents	  have	  no	  effect	  on	  what	  they	  end	  up	  doing.	  	   By	  contrast,	  suppose	  we	  start	  out	  with	  the	  assumption	  that	  people’s	  ordinary	  understanding	  is	  well	  captured	  by	  the	  scientific	  vision.	  Now	  our	  starting	  assumption	  is	  that	  people	  think	  of	  ordinary	  human	  action	  as	  causally	  determined	  by	  psychological	  states.	  We	  then	  learn	  a	  new	  fact.	  When	  people	  are	  told	  about	  a	  universe	  in	  which	  all	  human	  actions	  are	  causally	  determined,	  they	  conclude	  that	  the	  actions	  of	  human	  beings	  in	  this	  universe	  do	  not	  depend	  in	  any	  way	  on	  their	  psychological	  states.	  How	  on	  earth	  are	  we	  to	  explain	  this	  fact?	  It	  is	  certainly	  possible	  that	  someone	  will	  come	  up	  with	  a	  viable	  solution	  here,	  but	  the	  problem	  is	  not	  looking	  like	  an	  easy	  one.	  	  
4.	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  transcendence	  vision	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  human	  actions	  are	  radically	  different	  from	  other	  sorts	  of	  events.	  We	  might	  explain	  the	  movements	  of	  a	  billiard	  ball	  by	  saying	  that	  its	  movements	  were	  caused	  by	  prior	  events,	  but	  the	  explanation	  of	  a	  human	  action	  would	  have	  to	  be	  entirely	  different.	  Human	  actions	  are	  not	  caused	  by	  prior	  events;	  they	  are	  chosen	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  reasons.	  	   This	  point	  comes	  out	  especially	  clearly	  when	  we	  consider	  events	  that	  might	  in	  some	  ways	  seem	  similar	  to	  human	  actions.	  Take	  the	  case	  of	  computers.	  One	  might	  think	  that	  the	  explanation	  of	  a	  computer’s	  output	  ought	  to	  resemble,	  at	  least	  in	  certain	  minimal	  respects,	  the	  explanation	  of	  a	  human	  action.	  (Computers	  contain	  internal	  representations,	  and	  their	  outputs	  can	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  those	  representations.)	  Yet,	  even	  on	  the	  transcendence	  vision,	  the	  output	  of	  a	  computer	  will	  be	  best	  understood	  as	  the	  product	  of	  a	  perfectly	  straightforward	  causal	  chain:	  	   Environment	   	  Program	   	  Output	  	  No	  matter	  what	  you	  think	  about	  the	  vexed	  questions	  surrounding	  human	  action,	  there	  is	  little	  temptation	  to	  suppose	  that	  anything	  equally	  mysterious	  is	  occurring	  in	  the	  case	  of	  computers.	  A	  computer	  does	  not	  proceed	  by	  considering	  its	  own	  program	  and	  then	  freely	  choosing	  which	  output	  to	  display.	  Rather,	  the	  program	  simply	  causes	  the	  computer	  to	  generate	  a	  particular	  output.	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   Indeed,	  one	  should	  be	  able	  to	  see	  this	  sort	  of	  straightforward	  causal	  chain	  even	  in	  certain	  kinds	  of	  cases	  in	  which	  a	  human	  being’s	  bodily	  movements	  are	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  her	  psychological	  states.	  Suppose	  that	  an	  agent	  is	  watching	  a	  scary	  movie	  and	  makes	  an	  involuntary	  grimace.	  The	  process	  might	  then	  go	  like	  this:	  	   Environment	   	  Emotions	   	  Facial	  Expressions	  	  The	  transcendence	  vision	  suggests	  that	  cases	  like	  this	  one	  are	  deeply	  different	  from	  cases	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  Voluntary	  actions	  might	  be	  seen	  as	  freely	  chosen	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  reasons,	  but	  clearly,	  no	  such	  thing	  is	  taking	  place	  in	  a	  case	  like	  this	  one.	  It	  is	  not	  as	  though	  the	  agent	  freely	  chooses	  to	  grimace	  and	  her	  reason	  for	  making	  that	  choice	  is	  that	  she	  is	  afraid.	  Rather,	  the	  fear	  directly	  causes	  the	  grimace.	  Here	  again,	  nothing	  more	  complex	  or	  mysterious	  is	  required.	  	   In	  short,	  the	  transcendence	  vision	  leaves	  us	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  is	  a	  fundamental	  difference	  between	  different	  kinds	  of	  explanation.	  It	  says	  that	  people’s	  way	  of	  explaining	  free	  human	  action	  should	  be	  deeply	  different	  from	  their	  way	  of	  explaining	  a	  computer’s	  behavior	  or	  an	  involuntary	  grimace.	  But	  in	  that	  case,	  it	  seems	  that	  we	  immediately	  arrive	  at	  a	  new	  testable	  prediction.	  If	  people’s	  way	  of	  understanding	  free	  human	  action	  is	  radically	  different	  from	  their	  way	  of	  understanding	  other	  sorts	  of	  events,	  and	  if	  the	  Nahmias-­‐Murray	  experiments	  do	  indeed	  give	  us	  a	  way	  of	  tapping	  into	  people’s	  understanding,	  then	  we	  should	  be	  able	  to	  use	  a	  modified	  Nahmias-­‐Murray	  experiment	  to	  show	  a	  difference	  between	  judgments	  about	  free	  human	  action	  and	  judgments	  about	  other	  sorts	  of	  events.	  	  To	  put	  this	  prediction	  to	  the	  test,	  I	  conducted	  a	  quick	  follow-­‐up	  study.	  All	  participants	  received	  the	  story	  about	  Universe	  A.	  Participants	  in	  the	  'human’	  condition	  then	  received	  the	  following	  question:	  	  Imagine	  that	  Universe	  A	  includes	  various	  people	  who	  have	  beliefs	  and	  values.	  	  Now	  please	  tell	  us	  whether	  you	  agree	  or	  disagree	  with	  the	  following	  statement:	  
• In	  Universe	  A,	  people's	  beliefs	  and	  values	  have	  no	  effect	  on	  what	  they	  end	  up	  being	  caused	  to	  do.	  	  Meanwhile,	  participants	  in	  the	  'computer’	  condition	  received	  the	  question:	  	  Imagine	  that	  Universe	  A	  includes	  various	  computers	  that	  use	  programs	  and	  data.	  	  Now	  please	  tell	  us	  whether	  you	  agree	  or	  disagree	  with	  the	  following	  statement:	  
• In	  Universe	  A,	  the	  computers'	  programs	  and	  data	  have	  no	  effect	  on	  what	  they	  end	  up	  being	  caused	  to	  do.	  Participants	  tended	  to	  agree	  with	  the	  statement	  in	  the	  human	  condition	  but	  to	  disagree	  with	  the	  statement	  in	  the	  computer	  condition.	  3	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Forty-­‐one	  people	  were	  recruited	  through	  Amazon’s	  Mechanical	  Turk.	  Ratings	  were	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  1	  (‘disagree’)	  to	  7	  (‘agree’).	  Agreement	  was	  higher	  in	  the	  human	  condition	  (M	  =	  5.4)	  than	  in	  the	  computer	  condition	  (M	  =	  3.6),	  t(39)	  =	  2.4,	  p	  <	  .05.	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Notice	  the	  striking	  pattern	  of	  intuitions	  people	  are	  showing	  in	  this	  case.	  They	  are	  saying	  that	  if	  everything	  in	  the	  universe	  is	  causally	  determined,	  then	  a	  computer’s	  data	  can	  still	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  its	  output	  but	  a	  human	  being’s	  beliefs	  cannot	  have	  any	  effect	  on	  her	  behavior.	  This	  is	  exactly	  the	  result	  one	  would	  predict	  if	  one	  started	  out	  with	  the	  assumption	  that	  people	  are	  adopting	  the	  transcendence	  vision,	  and	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  one	  would	  explain	  it	  on	  any	  other	  hypothesis.	  To	  further	  get	  at	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  effect	  here,	  I	  conducted	  a	  second	  study	  using	  an	  even	  more	  closely	  controlled	  pair	  of	  cases.	  This	  time,	  participants	  in	  the	  ‘reason’	  condition	  received	  the	  following	  question:	  	  Imagine	  that	  the	  people	  in	  Universe	  A	  perform	  various	  actions.	  Now	  please	  tell	  us	  whether	  you	  agree	  or	  disagree	  with	  the	  following	  statement:	  
• In	  Universe	  A,	  people's	  beliefs	  and	  values	  have	  no	  effect	  on	  what	  actions	  they	  end	  up	  performing.	  Other	  participants	  were	  assigned	  to	  the	  'non-­‐reason’	  condition:	  Imagine	  that	  the	  people	  in	  Universe	  A	  make	  various	  facial	  expressions.	  Now	  please	  tell	  us	  whether	  you	  agree	  or	  disagree	  with	  the	  following	  statement:	  
• In	  Universe	  A,	  people's	  emotions	  have	  no	  effect	  on	  what	  facial	  expressions	  they	  end	  up	  making.	  Here	  again,	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  difference	  between	  conditions.	  People	  tended	  to	  agree	  in	  the	  reason	  condition	  but	  not	  in	  the	  non-­‐reason	  condition.4	  What	  we	  have	  here,	  then,	  is	  an	  even	  more	  tightly	  controlled	  minimal	  pair.	  If	  the	  universe	  is	  completely	  deterministic,	  people	  think	  that	  an	  agent’s	  emotions	  can	  still	  impact	  her	  facial	  expressions	  but	  that	  an	  agent’s	  beliefs	  cannot	  impact	  her	  actions.	  Once	  again,	  these	  are	  exactly	  the	  results	  one	  would	  expect	  if	  one	  started	  out	  with	  the	  view	  that	  people	  accept	  the	  transcendence	  vision.	  	  Of	  course,	  if	  we	  start	  out	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  people	  accept	  the	  scientific	  vision,	  we	  might	  be	  able	  to	  develop	  an	  alternative	  explanation	  for	  these	  findings,	  but	  this	  is	  beginning	  to	  look	  like	  a	  losing	  battle.	  To	  hold	  onto	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  people	  accept	  the	  scientific	  vision,	  we	  would	  need	  to	  develop	  an	  alternative	  explanation	  for	  the	  findings	  about	  people’s	  explicit	  judgments	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  our	  universe,	  and	  for	  the	  findings	  about	  moral	  responsibility	  judgments,	  and	  for	  the	  Nahmias-­‐Murray	  findings,	  and	  for	  these	  new	  findings	  about	  the	  way	  people’s	  judgments	  about	  emotions	  differ	  from	  their	  judgments	  about	  beliefs.	  Why	  would	  we	  be	  at	  all	  drawn	  to	  pursue	  a	  research	  program	  along	  these	  lines?	  	  
5.	  Clearly,	  the	  claim	  that	  people	  accept	  something	  like	  the	  scientific	  vision	  is	  not	  just	  a	  single	  isolated	  hypothesis.	  It	  is	  a	  natural	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  picture	  of	  how	  the	  human	  mind	  works,	  and	  one	  might	  think	  that	  the	  only	  way	  to	  really	  do	  justice	  to	  this	  claim	  is	  to	  understand	  it	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  larger	  picture	  in	  which	  it	  is	  embedded.	  	  	   The	  larger	  picture	  says	  that	  people’s	  basic	  way	  of	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  world	  is	  something	  more	  or	  less	  like	  a	  scientific	  theory.	  This	  picture	  has	  been	  developed	  in	  rich	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Forty	  people	  were	  recruited	  through	  Amazon’s	  Mechanical	  Turk.	  Ratings	  were	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  1	  (‘disagree’)	  to	  7	  (‘agree’).	  Agreement	  was	  higher	  in	  the	  reason	  condition	  (M	  =	  5.7)	  than	  in	  the	  non-­‐reason	  condition	  (M	  =	  3.5),	  t(38)	  =	  3.3,	  p	  <	  .005.	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theoretical	  detail,	  and	  it	  has	  been	  applied	  in	  research	  on	  everything	  from	  people’s	  causal	  judgments	  (e.g.,	  Gopnik,	  Glymour,	  Sobel,	  Schulz,	  Kushnir	  &	  Danks	  2004)	  to	  their	  understanding	  of	  psychological	  states	  (e.g.,	  Churchland	  1981).	  One	  can	  then	  apply	  this	  general	  picture	  quite	  straightforwardly	  to	  the	  question	  under	  discussion	  here.	  From	  a	  more	  scientific	  perspective,	  the	  transcendence	  vision	  looks	  a	  bit	  spooky,	  perhaps	  even	  conceptually	  incoherent.	  So	  if	  one	  starts	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  people’s	  way	  of	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  world	  is	  a	  broadly	  scientific	  one,	  it	  may	  begin	  to	  seem	  just	  obvious	  that	  people	  have	  to	  accept	  something	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  the	  scientific	  vision.	  	  	   In	  my	  view,	  this	  type	  of	  argument	  is	  a	  very	  powerful	  one.	  If	  we	  find	  a	  general	  picture	  that	  ends	  up	  generating	  accurate	  predictions	  in	  one	  domain	  after	  another,	  there	  is	  certainly	  strong	  reason	  to	  suspect	  that	  it	  will	  continue	  to	  prove	  accurate	  when	  we	  switch	  over	  to	  a	  new	  domain.	  Indeed,	  even	  if	  we	  run	  into	  some	  difficulties	  in	  this	  new	  domain,	  it	  might	  be	  reasonable	  to	  try	  dismissing	  those	  difficulties	  and	  sticking	  with	  the	  general	  picture.	  One	  might	  say:	  ‘This	  general	  picture	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  correct	  in	  so	  many	  other	  cases.	  We	  might	  be	  running	  into	  some	  troubles	  right	  at	  the	  moment,	  but	  if	  we	  stick	  with	  our	  general	  research	  program,	  we	  will	  surely	  be	  able	  to	  work	  them	  out	  in	  the	  end.’	  Such	  a	  response	  could,	  in	  the	  right	  circumstances,	  be	  exactly	  the	  right	  one.	  	  	   But,	  of	  course,	  the	  argument	  cuts	  both	  ways.	  One	  of	  the	  major	  results	  of	  existing	  work	  in	  experimental	  philosophy	  is	  that	  when	  one	  looks	  in	  detail	  at	  people's	  ordinary	  intuitions,	  one	  finds	  that	  these	  intuitions	  look	  very	  different	  from	  anything	  one	  would	  expect	  to	  find	  in	  the	  sciences.	  When	  one	  looks	  at	  intuitions	  about	  happiness	  or	  knowledge,	  one	  finds	  that	  these	  intuitions	  are	  shaped	  by	  moral	  considerations	  (e.g.,	  Beebe	  &	  Buckwalter	  2010;	  Phillips,	  Nyholm	  &	  Liao	  forthcoming).	  When	  one	  looks	  at	  intuitions	  about	  mental	  states,	  one	  finds	  that	  they	  do	  not	  conform	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  functionalist	  approach	  found	  in	  cognitive	  science	  but	  instead	  take	  our	  embodiment	  into	  account	  (Huebner	  2010;	  Knobe	  &	  Prinz	  2008;	  cf.	  Sytsma	  &	  Machery	  2009).	  When	  one	  looks	  at	  intuitions	  about	  causation,	  one	  finds	  that	  these	  intuitions	  follow	  patterns	  that	  are	  deeply	  different	  from	  those	  involved	  in	  scientific	  causal	  modeling	  (Alicke,	  Rose	  &	  Bloom	  2011;	  Hitchcock	  &	  Knobe	  2011;	  Sytsma,	  Livengood	  &	  Rose	  forthcoming).	  Similar	  results	  have	  been	  found	  in	  numerous	  other	  domains	  (for	  a	  review,	  see	  Knobe	  2010).	  	  	   So	  perhaps	  we	  can	  now	  turn	  the	  argument	  around	  and	  run	  it	  in	  the	  other	  direction.	  We	  have	  a	  general	  research	  program	  of	  investigating	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  people’s	  ordinary	  intuitive	  understanding	  is	  deeply	  different	  from	  the	  kind	  of	  understanding	  one	  finds	  in	  the	  sciences,	  and	  this	  research	  program	  has	  generated	  accurate	  predictions	  in	  numerous	  other	  domains.	  We	  now	  have	  good	  reason	  to	  suspect	  that	  this	  general	  program	  will	  prove	  helpful	  in	  the	  present	  case	  as	  well.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	   This	  chapter	  has	  been	  concerned	  with	  questions	  about	  how	  people	  ordinarily	  understand	  free	  human	  action.	  Consider	  again	  the	  sentence:	  ‘John	  went	  to	  New	  York	  because	  he	  wanted	  to	  visit	  his	  sister.’	  This	  sentence	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  John	  freely	  chose	  to	  perform	  an	  action	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  certain	  reasons.	  How	  exactly	  do	  people	  ordinarily	  make	  sense	  of	  this	  notion?	  	   One	  plausible	  view	  would	  be	  that	  we	  can	  capture	  the	  ordinary	  understanding	  of	  free	  action	  using	  more	  or	  less	  the	  approach	  found	  in	  contemporary	  cognitive	  science.	  Perhaps	  our	  sentence	  means	  that	  John	  had	  a	  desire	  to	  visit	  his	  sister	  and	  that	  this	  desire	  figured	  in	  a	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complex	  cognitive	  process	  that	  eventually	  caused	  him	  to	  go	  to	  New	  York.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  we	  want	  to	  capture	  the	  notion	  that	  he	  performed	  this	  action	  freely,	  we	  might	  then	  invoke	  various	  other	  cognitive	  scientific	  concepts	  (self-­‐regulation,	  cognitive	  control,	  etc.).	  	   I	  have	  argued	  that	  this	  approach	  is	  misguided.	  Our	  ordinary	  way	  of	  making	  sense	  of	  free	  action	  is	  deeply	  different	  from	  anything	  that	  appears	  in	  cognitive	  science	  and,	  indeed,	  from	  anything	  in	  the	  sciences	  more	  generally.	  So	  as	  long	  as	  we	  are	  working	  within	  a	  broadly	  scientific	  framework,	  we	  will	  never	  be	  talking	  about	  the	  very	  thing	  that	  people	  are	  getting	  at	  with	  their	  ordinary	  notion	  of	  free	  will.	  	   Of	  course,	  in	  making	  this	  claim	  about	  the	  ordinary	  notion,	  I	  do	  not	  mean	  to	  be	  ruling	  out	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  scientific	  theory	  of	  free	  will.	  We	  might	  well	  find	  in	  the	  end	  that	  we	  have	  reasons	  of	  one	  kind	  or	  another	  to	  conclude	  that	  certain	  cognitive	  phenomena	  actually	  are	  sufficient	  for	  free	  action.	  But	  if	  we	  do	  go	  down	  this	  route,	  we	  should	  be	  clear	  about	  what	  we	  are	  doing.	  We	  will	  not	  be	  simply	  working	  out	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  ordinary	  understanding	  of	  free	  action.	  Instead,	  we	  will	  be	  abandoning	  this	  ordinary	  notion	  and	  replacing	  it	  with	  a	  very	  different	  one.	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